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because waters in the canal and in the wetlands conservation area were
both "navigable waters of the United States," the pump station could
not be said to "add" any pollutant to the nation's navigable waters,
whether or not it would otherwise constitute a point source. Because
SFWMD failed to raise the issue before the courts below, however, the
Court declined to address it, leaving it to SFWMD to raise it on
remand.
Owen Walker

Virginia v. Maryland, 124 S. Ct. 598 (U.S. 2003) (holding in absence of
express grant of regulatory authority in interstate compact and
arbitration award governing Potomac River, each state was free to
regulate activities only of its own citizens with regard to use of the
river, and Virginia did not lose sovereign riparian rights by acquiescing
to Maryland's regulation).
The Commonwealth of Virginia sought a declaration from the
United States Supreme Court that it had a right to withdraw water
from and construct improvements appurtenant to the Potomac River
free from the regulatory authority of the State of Maryland. Maryland
objected to the Special Master's report recommending that the Court
grant Virginia's requested relief. A majority of the Court overruled
Maryland's exceptions in a 7-2 ruling.
The Potomac forms much of the boundary between Maryland and
Virginia as it flows from the Appalachians to Chesapeake Bay. Both
Maryland and Virginia claimed ownership of the river under
conflicting seventeenth century royal charters.
Virginia ceded
ownership of the river to Maryland in its 1776 State Constitution, but
specifically excepted from cession "the free navigation and use of the
Rivers Potowmack and Pocomoke, and all improvements made on
Virginia's shores." However, in the same year Maryland passed a
constitutional resolution rejecting Virginia's constitutional reservation.
In 1785, Maryland and Virginia appointed commissioners to
resolve their differences. The commissioners agreed on the Mount
Vernon Compact ("1785 Compact"), which the legislatures of both
states ratified. The 1785 Compact provided that the Potomac "shall be
considered as a common highway, for the purpose of navigation and
commerce.., and that all laws regulating fishing and navigation shall
be made with the mutual consent and approbation of both states."
Further, the 1785 Compact explained "the citizens of each state
respectively shall have full property in the shores of Potowmack river
[sic] ... and the privilege of making and carrying out wharves and
other improvements, so as not to obstruct navigation of the River."
The 1785 Compact did not, however, determine the precise
boundary line in the river. After nearly a century of conflict, the states
submitted the boundary dispute to arbitration.
The arbitration
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culminated in the Black-Jenkins Award ("Award"), which placed the
boundary line at the low-water mark on the Virginia shore of the river.
While the Award gave Maryland entire ownership of the river's bed, it
granted Virginia the right to use the river beyond the low-water mark
as necessary to the full enjoyment of Virginia's riparian ownership.
Congress subsequently ratified the BlackJenkins Award in 1879.
In 1933, Maryland established a permitting system for water
withdrawals on the Potomac, and has since issued several permits to
In 1996, the Fairfax County Water Authority
Virginia entities.
("FCWA") applied for a permit from Maryland to build a water intake
structure extending 725 feet from the Virginia shore to improve water
quality for Fairfax County residents. The Maryland Department of the
Environment ("MDE") denied FWCA's application, citing Virginia's
lack of sufficient need for the structure. Virginia then filed a
complaint in the United States Supreme Court, invoking its original
jurisdiction to hear disputes between states.
The Court initially referred Virginia's complaint to the Special
Master. The Special Master recommended the Court find for Virginia,
concluding that (1) the 1785 Compact and Award gave Virginia the
right to construct improvements into the river and the right to use the
river beyond the low-water mark, (2) neither the 1785 Compact nor
the Award gave Maryland authority to regulate Virginia's activities, and
(3) Maryland had no defense of acquiescence by Virginia. Maryland
then filed exceptions to the Special Master's Report.
Reviewing the Special Master's recommendations, the Court
applied canons of statutory interpretation in reviewing both the 1785
Compact and Award. First, the Court held the 1785 Compact's plain
language guaranteed the citizens of each state the right to build
improvements regardless of which state was ultimately determined to
be sovereign over the river. Maryland argued that the 1785 Compact's
regulatory silence merely confirmed that its authority over the river
was well settled before the 1785 Compact. The Court rejected this
argument, identifying several cases showing that Maryland's
sovereignty was in fact in dispute.
Next, the Court turned to the Award. The Award held that
Virginia had gained ownership by prescription of the soil up to the
low-water mark. Maryland again argued that the Award simply
confirmed its well-settled ownership of the river. The Court again
disagreed, noting that the States would not have entered arbitration if
Maryland's authority was indeed well settled. Therefore, the Court
held that the right to use the river beyond the low-water mark was a
right of Virginia as a sovereign, and the Award's plain language did
not make this right subject to Maryland's regulatory authority.
The Court also rejected Maryland's argument that the Award
merely confirmed prior existing common law private property rights
which were subject to Maryland's regulation, finding that the
Arbitration proceedings occurred specifically to "ascertain and fix the
boundary" between the coequal sovereigns.
Further, the Court
rejected Maryland's claim that Virginia could only exercise its riparian
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rights "without otherwise interfering with the proper use of [the river]
by Maryland," holding instead that each state had a sovereign right to
build improvements appurtenant to the shore without interfering with
the other's proper use.
Finally, the Court considered whether Virginia lost its sovereign
riparian rights by prescription and by acquiescing to Maryland's
regulation of the river. To succeed on the affirmative defense of
acquiescence, Maryland must show: (1) a long and continuous period
of sovereignty over Virginia's riparian activities, and (2) Virginia's
acquiescence in its prescriptive acts.
Further, the period of
prescription must be substantial and Maryland must show
acquiescence by a failure to protest Maryland's asserted sovereignty.
Applying this standard, the Court concluded that negotiations during
the Water Resources Development Act of 1976 ("WRDA") and Low
Flow Allocation Agreement reached by the states pursuant to the
WRDA conclusively showed that Virginia vigorously protested
Maryland's claimed authority and explicitly asserted its sovereign
rights. Because Maryland failed to prove acquiescence, the Court
overruled Maryland's exceptions to the Special Master's report and
granted Virginia's requested relief.
Justice Stevens wrote a brief dissent, in which Justice Kennedy
joined. Justice Stevens maintained that states may exercise their police
powers by controlling the initiation and conduct of riparian uses of
water. Because all riparian rights at common law are subject to the
paramount regulatory authority of the sovereign that owns the river,
Justice Stevens voted to sustain Maryland's exceptions to the Special
Master's recommendations.
Justice Kennedy also wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Stevens joined. Justice Kennedy found that the 1785 Compact's plain
language showed that Maryland had long held title to both the river
and its bed, and the Award did not expand Virginia's rights beyond
those in the 1785 Compact. Further, Justice Kennedy found that a
party does not concede that its rights are unclear by arbitration or
compact negotiations. First, the 1785 Compact only gave Virginia
rights of a riparian owner beyond the low water line. Second, the
Award merely recognized Virginia's limited rights gained by
prescription.
Therefore, Justice Kennedy also voted to sustain
Maryland's exceptions and deny Virginia's requested relief.
JaredB. Briant

